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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











       Appellant 
________________ 
 
 Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-19-cr-00193-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Marilyn J. Horan 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
on November 19, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Cameron Basking appeals his drug and firearm convictions, alleging violations of 
his rights to a speedy trial, to be free from unreasonable searches, and to call witnesses.  
He also asserts that the District Court erred in failing to order the government to return 
forfeited property.  We will affirm. 
I 
 On March 14, 2018, the FBI executed warrants to search Basking’s person and 
several properties based on an affidavit by Special Agent John Balish.  The FBI found 
firearms, drugs, and evidence of drug distribution on the properties, including in a house 
at 401 West Carter Drive.  Basking was arrested and charged by Criminal Complaint with 
possessing heroin and fentanyl with the intent to distribute them, possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of that crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.  
 Between April 2018 and October 2018, the District Court granted four motions to 
extend the speedy-trial deadline, the last of which was filed after the previous extension 
had expired.  Although the Federal Public Defender was appointed as Basking’s counsel 
on April 3, 2018, the government stated in each Motion that Basking consented to the 
continuances through private counsel, William Difenderfer.  On December 13, 2018, 
Difenderfer entered his appearance.  On December 14, 2018, and February 28, 2019, the 
District Court again granted motions extending the speedy-trial deadline to February 22 
and June 22, 2019, again with Difenderfer’s consent.  On May 21, 2019, Basking’s new 
counsel, Chris Eyster, moved to, inter alia, dismiss the charges because of alleged 
Speedy Trial Act violations.  The District Court rejected this ground for dismissal.   
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 On June 25, 2019, after another extension, the government indicted Basking, 
charging him with conspiracy, possessing fentanyl and cocaine with intent to distribute, 
possessing a firearm in furtherance of that crime, and being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  On September 9, 2019, the District Court denied Basking’s Motion to Suppress 
evidence found at 401 West Carter Drive.  A jury convicted Basking on all counts.  The 
District Court then denied his motions seeking to compel production of grand jury 
transcripts and the return of a Chevrolet Camaro seized by the FBI. 
II 
A. 
 Basking claims that the District Court erred in failing to suppress the evidence 
recovered from 401 West Carter Drive.  We disagree.  Evidence obtained pursuant to a 
search warrant will not be excluded unless the affidavit is “so lacking in indicia of 
probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.”1  This is 
a heavy burden, and Basking has not met it.2 
 The affidavit here is not bare bones.  Based on his training and experience, Agent 
Balish stated that drug dealers often maintain and use multiple properties to spread out 
and conceal their drugs, weapons, and cash, and that Basking engaged in that behavior.3  
He described Basking driving from 1415 Princeton Boulevard and his home at 3021 
Viola Street to (1) a noncompleted controlled drug sale to a confidential informant 
 
1 United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 217 (3d Cir. 2018). 
2 United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2012). 
3 See United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 292–93, 298–99 (3d Cir. 2000) (affirming 
magistrate’s reliance on officer’s affidavit based on his experience with stash houses). 
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scheduled in November 2017, (2) a completed sale to the informant in February 2018, 
and (3) another completed sale with a co-conspirator to an unidentified buyer in February 
2018.  Shortly before another scheduled sale with the informant, Basking and the co-
conspirator drove from the latter’s home to 401 West Carter Drive, the co-conspirator 
went inside, and then they both drove away recklessly, forcing the FBI to discontinue 
surveillance temporarily.  Basking then called the informant to set a meeting place, 
briefly went into 1415 Princeton Boulevard alone, and then drove directly to the 
controlled sale.  Thus, the “affidavit to some degree linked every location with either drug 
activity or an alleged or confirmed drug dealer.”4  It connected 401 West Carter Drive to 
Basking, to a known co-conspirator, and to evasive driving shortly before a controlled 
drug sale.  Based on the above, we conclude that the District Court properly denied the 
motion to suppress. 
B. 
 Basking contends that the government violated the Speedy Trial Act and Sixth 
Amendment by failing to indict him within thirty days of his arrest.  Although the Act 
excludes delays caused by continuances granted in the interest of justice,5 Basking argues 
that the October 2018 and February 2019 continuances were not excludable because they 
were granted after the prior continuances had elapsed. 
 
4 United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 562 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents 
($92,422.57), 307 F.3d 137, 147 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he simple fact that Kim’s cashed 
checks from grocery stores implicated in the food stamp trafficking scheme is strong 
evidence that Kim’s was also involved in the scheme.”). 
5 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 
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 Basking is judicially estopped from raising this argument.  Judicial estoppel 
“generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and 
then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”6  Basking 
consented to the granting of each motion.  The motions each stated that the parties were 
“engaged in discussions regarding a plea agreement” and that “[a]dditional time” was 
needed to “permit the parties to explore fully the law and the particular circumstances 
associated with this case.”7  Basking argues that Difenderfer could not consent to the 
October continuance on his behalf because he did not enter his appearance until 
December 2018.  Basking cites no authority, however, for the position that an attorney 
cannot negotiate for a defendant outside of court before filing a notice of appearance.  
Difenderfer had been representing and advising Basking since April 2018.  
 The District Court adopted the parties’ position that the benefits “from a pre-
indictment agreement which provides for judicial economy are substantial and in the best 
interest of justice.”8  Basking benefited from these continuances, receiving more time to 
try to negotiate a plea agreement and to get new counsel who ultimately tried the case.  
Accordingly, we conclude that there was no Speedy Trial Act violation. 
C. 
 
6 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). 
7 Mot. For Extension of Time ¶ 4, United States v. Basking, No. 18-mj-411 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 29, 2018), ECF No. 18. 
8 United States v. Basking, No. 18-mj-411, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2018); see also 
United States v. Fields, 39 F.3d 439, 445 (3d Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that “an ‘ends 
of justice’ continuance may not be granted in appropriate circumstances to permit plea 
negotiations to continue”). 
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 Basking asserts that he was entitled to access Task Force Officer Lee Niebel’s 
grand jury testimony and to call him at trial to explore alleged discrepancies between the 
Complaint, Indictment, and another agent’s trial testimony.  We disagree.  The District 
Court precluded the testimony of Officer Niebel proffered by Basking because it was 
hearsay.  Basking did not explain then, and does not explain now, why the testimony was 
admissible.  Even if it were admissible, however, its exclusion would be harmless error.  
The evidence against Basking—including his admissions—was overwhelming, and he 
does not argue that he was otherwise prevented from raising a defense.9 
 As for the grand jury testimony, Basking did not file a motion for production until 
after he had filed his appeal.  At this time, the District Court no longer had jurisdiction 
over the case.  Even if it had, Basking has not shown a “compelling necessity” for the 
testimony10 or otherwise identified an applicable exception to the general rule that grand 
jury transcripts are not discoverable.   
D. 
 Finally, Basking argues that the District Court erred in failing to order the 
government to return the Camaro.  A claim challenging an administrative forfeiture must 
 
9 See United States v. DeMuro, 677 F.3d 550, 566–67 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
exclusion of testimony was harmless where the evidence against defendant was 
“substantial,” the proffered testimony has “minimal probative value,” and she failed to 
“describe[] the substance of any further testimony from” the excluded witness); United 
States v. Hanson, 994 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1993). 
10 United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 1989).  Nor has Basking 
identified any authority allowing a prosecutor to forfeit the secrecy of the transcripts by 
stating initially that she would produce them.  To the contrary, the government is 
forbidden from disclosing the contents of grand jury proceedings except in limited 
circumstances.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)–(3). 
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“state the claimant’s interest in such property” and “be made under oath.”11  Basking did 
not show that he has an interest in the Camaro or make his motion under oath.  Although 
Agent Balish stated in his affidavit supporting the search warrants that the Camaro was 
“registered to Cameron Basking/Shevonne Booth,”12 Basking stated in his motion that 
the car belonged to his girlfriend.  Because Basking did not show that he had an interest 
in the car, the District Court did not err in dismissing his claim. 
III 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the Judgment and Orders of the District 
Court.  
 
11 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(C)(ii)–(iii).  Because the Parties have not identified a completed 
forfeiture proceeding involving the car, let alone shown that the car was sold, we review 
this claim under § 983(a) rather than (e).  Even if § 983(e) applied, however, Basking 
would still have to show that he has an “interest in the property” such that he was 
“entitled to written notice” of the forfeiture proceeding. 
12 Gov’t’s Supp. Appx. at 17.  
